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THE WINNING WORD FOR SCRABBLE CHAMPION
IS "CONTRACT"
When Mark Landsberg thought his book on Scrabble strategy had
been wrongfully copied by the makers of the game, he responded with a
seven-letter word-LAWSUIT. In Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword
Game Players, Inc. ("Landsberg I"),' the Ninth Circuit found against
Landsberg, holding that a factual work will not be deemed infringed un-
less the similarity of expression in the second work is a near verbatim
reproduction.2 Two years later in the same case on appeal for different
issues ("Landsberg H"),3 the Ninth Circuit found that an implied con-
tract had been formed to pay for Landsberg's idea and breached because
there was use of the idea, and its initial disclosure had been made in
confidence. 4 Landsberg had shown that he was not just playing games.
Plaintiff Landsberg, "Scrabble Champion of Southern California, '
wrote a manuscript explaining his system for winning at Scrabble.
Landsberg intended to publish his work and requested permission from
defendant Selchow & Righter ("S & R"), producer of Scrabble, to use the
Scrabble trademark.6 In response, S & R asked for a copy of the manu-
script for evaluation, which Landsberg submitted. A short time later S &
R contacted Landsberg, again asking for a second copy, claiming that the
first had been misplaced.7 When the second manuscript arrived, it was
forwarded to Michael Senkiewicz, an S & R editor, who was working on
updating a previous book on Scrabble.' Senkiewicz was impressed with
1. 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Landsberg I].
The prior history of the case is confusing. Following trial in 1979, the court issued its Memo-
randum of Decision, published as Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 212
U.S.P.Q. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1979). After extensive briefing and argument over the form of the
findings and conclusions, Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law were adopted in 1980,
published as Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 159 (C.D.
Cal. 1980). For convenience, the trial court's decision shall be referred to as "Landsberg" and
the Findings of Facts as "Landsberg facts."
2. Landsberg I, 736 F.2d at 488.
3. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter Landsberg II].
4. Id. at 1197.
5. Landsberg I, 736 F.2d at 486.
6. Landsbergfacts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 160.
7. Brief for Appellee at 9-10. Landsberg II, 802 F.2d 1193 [hereinafter "Appellee's
Brief"].
8. Landsberg facts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 161. The earlier work entitled, "How to Win at
Scrabble," had been published through S & R in 1953 and was outdated. It was to be used as a
model by Senkiewicz because he had no previous authorship experience. After comparing the
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the work, having never seen a notation system developed for Scrabble
before.9 Senkiewicz reported to S & R that the work was excellent.'0
S & R began negotiating with Landsberg for the rights to his manu-
script. The negotiations lasted several months during which time S & R
never made an offer satisfactory to Landsberg. " Finally, Landsberg de-
manded the return or destruction of all copies of his work. S & R ap-
peared to comply but secretly allowed Senkiewicz to keep a copy of the
manuscript. 2 After negotiations with Landsberg terminated, S & R con-
tracted with Senkiewicz to produce a Scrabble strategy book.' 3 A short
time later, S & R released the handbook. It included a version of a nota-
tional system for playing the game similar to Landsberg's. 4
Landsberg sued S & R, Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., a
subsidiary, and Crown Publishers 5 ("the defendants") in Los Angeles
Superior Court for infringement of common-law copyright16 and breach
of implied contract. The defendants removed the case to federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction.' 7 The district court found that S & R had
works, the trial court held that the earlier work was of no help to Senkiewicz in establishing
the format or substance of his book whereas Landsberg's book closely paralleled Senkiewicz's
work. Id.
9. Id. Notational systems have long been used for games such as chess or backgammon
and are in the public domain. What the trial court found relevant was that no notational
system or anything of substance was developed until after Landsberg's manuscript arrived.
Landsberg, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 155.
10. Landsbergfacts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 161. During depositions, key people in S & R testi-
fied that Landsberg's notational system was "garbage." At trial, however, Senkiewicz testified
that the written work was excellent and meritorious. The district court found the denials of
excellence to be unbelievable. Appellee's Brief at 13, Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.
1984).
11. Landsberg facts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 161. The court found this was a bad faith tactic to
keep Landsberg dangling while S & R readied its book. Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at 487.
12. Landsbergfacts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 161.
13. Id. The contract included an outline for the proposed book that the district court
found had been copied from Landsberg's manuscript. Id.
14. S & R's notational system was alpha-numeric whereas Landsberg's system used sym-
bols. The court did not find the two systems identical, but that S & R imitated the idea of
plaintiff's system. Landsberg, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 157.
15. Also named were Lee Tiffany, a managerial level employee of S & R, Drue Conklin, an
account executive, and Michael Senkiewicz. Conklin and Senkiewicz were never served with
process. Lee Tiffany settled during the course of trial. Id. at 156.
16. Id. Landsberg's copyright cause of action was governed by state law (common-law
copyright) rather than federal law because the alleged infringements took place before the
federal law took effect. This distinction proved unimportant for the analysis because Califor-
nia and federal law followed the same standards for infringement. Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at
487.
17. The diversity statute confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in all civil actions be-
tween citizens of different states in which the jurisdictional amount is met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1948). Landsberg was a resident of California, and Crown Publishers and S & R were incor-
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infringed Landsberg's copyright by copying both his ideas and his ex-
pression. A permanent injunction was issued, and Landsberg was
awarded actual and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.' 8 S &
R appealed.' 9
LANDSBERG I: A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF INFRINGEMENT
FOR FACTUAL WORKS
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment for Lands-
berg.2° In reaching this result, the court repeated the axiom of copyright
law that the protection granted to a copyrighted work extends only to an
author's expression of the idea, not to the idea itself.2' While ideas used
in fictional works can be expressed with "infinite variations," the court
noted, ideas contained in factual works can usually only be expressed in a
limited number of ways. Because of this limitation, a subsequent author
of a factual work may have to use expression very similar to that of the
first author merely to express the same idea. To find such use infringing,
however, would, in effect, extend copyright protection to unprotectable
ideas. Therefore, the amount of similarity needed for a finding of in-
fringement should vary according to the context in which it is applied,
and the test used for fictional works is inappropriate for determining
whether a factual work has been infringed. So that ideas may remain
freely usable, the similarity needed to infringe a factual work will have to
be verbatim reproduction or very close paraphrasing.22 To support this
holding, the court noted the doctrine of scenes a faire as an example of
how the amount of substantial similarity that constitutes infringement
porated and had their principal places of business in states other than California. Landsberg
facts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 160. Because diversity existed and the case could have been originally
brought in federal court, the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948) allowed S & R to re-
move the action to federal court.
18. Attorney's fees and costs were awarded under either 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976) which
gives the court discretion to award costs and fees to the winning party or the vexatious litigant
rule as defined in Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 111 (9th Cir. 1972), because of S & R's bad
faith tactics during trial. Landsbergfacts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 161. Total liability which included
the profits realized by S & R and Crown Publishers through December 31, 1978 from the sale
of the book, attorney's fees, costs and punitive damages came to approximately $440,300.
Landsberg II, 802 F.2d at 1157.
19. S & R ignored the judgment and continued to sell its handbook. Landsberg sued again
for continuing infringement under the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. The court
granted Landsberg's motion for summary judgment but refused to award further exemplary
damages. S & R appealed both decisions and Landsberg appealed the denial of damages.
Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at 487.
20. Id. at 489.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
22. Landsberg I, 736 F.2d at 488.
1988]
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varies according to the idea expressed. Under that doctrine, expression
which "as a practical matter is indispensable or at least standard in the
treatment of a given [idea]" is not protectable by copyright.23 The ra-
tionale is that since scenes a faire are necessary to the telling of an idea,
protecting them would effectively give the first author a monopoly on use
of the idea.
Applying these principles to the case, the court concluded that
although the works were similar in expression, such similarities "must
unavoidably be produced by anyone who wishes to use and restate the
unprotectable ideas contained in Landsberg's work."24 Because S & R
did not use more of Landsberg's expression than was necessary to state
the idea, the court found no infringement.25
The court then addressed Landsberg's breach of contract cause of
action. Though the district court had found that Landsberg reasonably
believed that S & R would not use his manuscript without paying him,26
the question remained whether Landsberg's initial disclosure of his man-
uscript was made in confidence. If so, the court noted, S & R's use of
Landsberg's ideas would have been wrongful.27 Because the district
court made no finding on this limited issue, the appellate court remanded
the case for further findings of fact.
LANDSBERG II: DISCLOSURE OF AN IDEA IN CONFIDENCE FOR AN
EXPRESS LIMITED PURPOSE MAY LEAD To THE
FORMATION OF AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
On remand, the district court found that Landsberg's initial disclo-
sure of his idea was for the limited purpose of obtaining use of the Scrab-
ble trademark, that Landsberg had expressed his intention to exploit his
manuscript commercially, and that S & R's negotiations with Landsberg
supported his reasonable belief that S & R would not use his manuscript
without compensating him for it.28 Additionally, the court found that S
23. Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460
F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
24. Landsberg I, 736 F.2d at 489.
25. For example, in Landsberg's manuscript, he stated: "The poor player simply attempts
to work as many points as possible each turn." In Senkiewicz's work, the statement appeared,
"The player who sees no other aim in Scrabble Crossword Game than to score the maximum
number of points will never be a good player." Landsberg, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 158. Although
these two statements are substantially similar, the appellate court believed these similarities
were not the result of copying but rather the result of the few possible ways of stating the idea.
Landsberg I, 736 F.2d at 489.
26. Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at 489.
27. Id. at 490.
28. Landsberg II, 802 F.2d at 1196. The trial court made its findings without retrial. Both
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& R's request for a second copy of the manuscript was conduct indicat-
ing the existence of an implied contract.2 9 In light of these findings, the
court granted Landsberg's motion for summary judgment. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.3"
On appeal, S & R argued that no contract had been formed because
Landsberg disclosed his idea of the Scrabble handbook before any con-
duct on S & R's part indicated a contractual relationship. Because his
disclosure was "blurted out,"3 they continued, no implied contract was
formed.32 S & R also argued that the idea of a Scrabble handbook was
one it already had, and therefore, Landsberg's disclosure was of no use to
them.33
In rejecting S & R's argument, the court relied on the district court's
supplemental findings and the guidance provided by the court in Lands-
berg I. Because these factual findings were not clearly erroneous, 34 the
court followed its earlier suggestion that if the disclosure was made in
confidence then its use would be wrongful. The court found that
although S & R did not use enough of the manuscript to support a find-
ing of copyright infringement, there was sufficient use to support a
breach of contract claim and upheld the summary judgment.3 5
sides filed briefs, together with proposed Supplemental Findings and Conclusions, and the trial
court issued its findings without any additional evidence or oral argument. Appellee's Brief,
supra note 7, at 6.
29. Appellee's Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
30. Landsberg II, 802 F.2d at 1197.
31. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956). No promise to pay for an idea
will be implied if the "idea man ... blurts out his idea without having first made his bargain."
Id. at 739.
32. Landsberg II, 802 F.2d at 1196.
33. Appellee's Brief, supra note 7, at 14. S & R also argued that Landsberg waived his
contract claim by not filing a cross appeal in the earlier appeal. The court found that there was
no waiver because their remand for further findings on the contract claim in Landsberg I
established as law of the case that the claim was neither waived nor abandoned. Landsberg II,
802 F.2d at 1197.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A trial court's findings respecting findings of fact are not to be
overturned unless clearly erroneous.
35. On appeal, S & R also contested the calculation of damages. They argued that:
(1) their profits were an improper measure of Landsberg's damages because the court included
the profits of the publisher who was not a party to the action; (2) the district court erred in
doubling the punitive damage award upon remand because the only intervening event was
their successful appeal; (3) the additional award of attorney's fees upon remand was improper;
and (4) the prejudgment interest award should not run from the date of the initial judgment
since that judgment had been reversed on the first appeal. The court agreed with their second
and fourth claims and modified Landsberg's judgment accordingly. Landsberg 11, 802 F.2d at
1197-1200.
1988]
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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
In order to prove infringement, a plaintiff needs to prove ownership
of the copyright and copying by the defendant.36 A plaintiff's ownership
relates in part to the concept of originality37 because only "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" are pro-
tected by copyright law.3" This requirement of originality means that the
work owes its origin to the author.39 Novelty is not required; evidence of
independent creation will suffice. 4'
The author of a work that is original and fixed in a tangible medium
is entitled to exercise specific statutory rights in his work4 and to bring a
suit for infringement against those who interfere with those rights.42
This right to exclude copiers, however, does not extend to the entire
work but only to the portions that are original to the author. Copyright,
therefore, does not protect ideas, procedures, processes, methods of oper-
ation, systems, concepts, principles or discoveries.43
Copying is usually established through proving access to, and sub-
stantial similarity between the works." There must be substantial simi-
larity not only of the general ideas but also of the expression of those
ideas.45 In Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
aid's Corp., ("Krofft")46 the Ninth Circuit introduced a two-step test for
determining if there is enough similarity to satisfy the substantial similar-
ity requirement of the infringement test. The first step is to analyze and
dissect specific criteria to determine whether the ideas of the two works
are substantially similar. This "extrinsic test" focuses on alleged similar-
ities in the objective details of the work. The second step, the "intrinsic
test," looks to see if the expression of the two ideas is substantially simi-
36. 3 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01, at 13-3 (1987).
37. Id. at 13-4. Other elements of ownership include the citizenship status of the author,
compliance with statutory formalities, and the validity of any transfer between the author and
the plaintiff (if the plaintiff is not the author). Id.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
39. 1 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 2-8.
40. Id. at 2-7.
41. These rights include the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform or display the
work and the right to prepare derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
44. Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
45. Cooling Sys. and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir.
1985). Although a plaintiff must show that ideas are substantially similar, ideas are not pro-
tected by copyright and therefore, cannot be infringed. Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525, 529
(9th Cir. 1987).
46. 562 F.2d at 1164.
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lar. In this prong, where dissection and analysis are inappropriate, the
similarity exists if the reasonable person would find the "total concept
and feel" of the two works similar. In order to find infringement both
steps of the test must be satisfied.a7
Because neither access nor ownership were disputed in the case, the
critical issue was whether the two works were substantially similar.4" In
applying the two-step test in Landsberg, the district court made specific
findings that showed copying of both idea and expression. The court
noted that Senkiewicz had used no other materials when preparing his
book besides Landsberg's manuscript; that Senkiewicz had no previous
authorship experience; that he had access to the manuscript at all times
during the preparation of his book; that nothing of substance had been
developed until his manuscript arrived; and that Senkiewicz was not
credible as a witness when he denied copying. 9 The court also specifi-
cally found that Landsberg's expression had been copied and that S & R
had crudely tried to paraphrase Landsberg's work to give it an appear-
ance of dissimilarity.
50
The Ninth Circuit accepted those factual findings, 51 but still held
that the district court applied the test too broadly by extending protec-
tion to Landsberg's ideas and stock expressions.2 In other words, the
appellate court did not dispute that S & R had copied from Landsberg's
manuscript, but found that what they had taken was not original, and
therefore not protected by copyright. The decision was erroneous for
several reasons.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED TEST FOR INFRINGEMENT
The first problem with the court's decision is that it failed to ade-
quately consider the circumstances in which S & R's book was written.
The trial court's detailed findings regarding the preparation of S & R's
book should have been given greater weight when deciding whether
Landsberg's book had been infringed.53 A Second Circuit decision which
47. Id. at 1165.
48. Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at 488.
49. Landsbergfacts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 161.
50. Id.
51. Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at 490. The court accepted all findings of fact with the excep-
tion of those relating to substantial similarity. Id.
52. Id. at 489.
53. Blumcroft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Bros. Inc., 373 F.2d 905, 906 (6th Cir. 1967)
(stating that because "[Ciopying by a defendant can rarely be proven by direct evidence[,] [i]t
is proper to consider all of the facts and circumstances in connection with the development of
the accused article.").
1988]
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recognized the importance of a trial court's findings of fact is Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. ("Meredith ")."4 In that case, the
plaintiff was the author of a leading psychology textbook. The defend-
ants, wishing to publish a competing textbook, hired several freelance
writers, many of whom had no background in psychology. Internal
memos revealed that the authors were instructed to use the plaintiff's
book as a model for the selection, length and sequencing of topics to be
included in the book and to avoid any material omissions from the plain-
tiff's text." After the book was published, plaintiff brought suit seeking
an injunction. The court granted the injunction, finding that the defend-
ants infringed by consciously paraphrasing and attempting to disguise
the plaintiff's work. 6
The decision in Meredith appears correct because of the unfairness
in allowing a defendant to escape liability in light of proof that he delib-
erately copied a plaintiff's work. Yet, the Landsberg I court reached the
opposite result even though the district court had found that S & R had
copied and attempted to disguise Landsberg's manuscript. This differ-
ence in result is not because the Ninth Circuit applied a different test but
because the test was misapplied. The Krofft court specifically stated and
applied the principle that where there is strong proof of access, less simi-
larity between the works will suffice.57 In Landsberg 1, S & R was in sole
possession of Landsberg's manuscript, yet the court not only refused to
lower the proof of similarity needed but also imposed a higher standard
due to the factual nature of the work. By analyzing the case as if it were
mere coincidence that S & R happened to publish a book on the same
subject as Landsberg, the court ignored the lack of independent crea-
tion58 by S & R and other strong circumstantial evidence which indicated
that Landsberg's protected expression had been copied and disguised.
The Ninth Circuit has held that "[s]ince the intrinsic test for expres-
sion is uniquely suited for determination by the trier of fact, this Court
must be reluctant to reverse it."59 By disregarding its own warning, the
Ninth Circuit inappropriately substituted its judgment for that of the
54. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. Id. at 688. A later memo showed one author's fear that the writers were plagiarizing.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
58. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). "[T]he
absence of any countervailing evidence of creation independent of the copyrighted source may
well render clearly erroneous a finding that there was no copying." Id.
59. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166.
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trial court." The result is a holding that is totally at odds with what
actually happened in the case.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT TEST FOR FACTUAL WORKS Is Too BROAD
As noted earlier, the court in Landsberg I decided that factual
works will not be deemed infringed unless the similarity of expression is
verbatim or very close paraphrasing.61 The cases the court cited for this
principle, however, were not on point because they involved works of a
different nature than the works here. In these cases, Hoehling v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc. ("Hoehling ")62 and Miller v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,63 both plaintiffs' factual works were based on news events in the
public domain. 6' In Hoehling, the court began by noting that neither
historical facts nor the interpretation or research of such facts are pro-
tected by copyright. In order to protect use of these facts to the fullest
extent possible and avoid a chilling effect on subsequent authors, the
court reasoned that broad latitude should be given to authors making use
of historical subject matter.65 Therefore, it held that "bodily appropria-
tion" would be needed for a finding of infringement.66
The rationale for limiting copyright protection in historical works is
that copyright protects only original authorship, and no one can claim to
be the author or originator of a fact. 67 This rationale may not be applica-
ble to this case because the facts involved in Landsberg's books are not
historical or newsworthy but an explanation of his strategy. The Ninth
Circuit erred by lumping all factual works into one category without rec-
ognizing that some types of factual works have a higher degree of origi-
nality and therefore, should not be afforded less protection.68 Whether
Landsberg's strategy should be subject to as minimal copyright protec-
tion as was afforded in Hoehling to a book describing the Hindenburg
disaster, should depend on whether the book related the one possible
60. Id.
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
63. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. In Miller, 650 F.2d at 1365, the news event involved a kidnapping. In Hoehling, 618
F.2d at 972, the works were based on the Hindenburg disaster.
65. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978.
66. Id. at 980.
67. 1 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 2-34.1.
68. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 560, 563 (1982) (stating that "one must caution that even within the field of factual
works there are gradations as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy .... The extent to
which one must permit expressive language to be copied ... will thus vary from case to case
and genre to genre."). Id.
1988]
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strategy for playing Scrabble, or whether his strategy was one of innu-
merable possibilities.69 If there was only one possible strategy, even if
Landsberg discovered it,7" it would not be protected by copyright be-
cause, like the Hindenburg disaster, such protection would prevent fur-
ther analysis of the material. If, however, Landsberg's strategy was one
imaginative creation out of many possible ways of playing the game, it is
more analogous to a fictional work. It should not be given less protection
because other authors can still develop their own imaginative theories as
to how the game should be played, just as subsequent authors of fictional
works can write on the same theme without infringing the first author's
work.7 1 By failing to determine whether Landsberg's strategy was closer
to fact or fiction before deciding the work was not protected,72 the
Landsberg I court formulated a rule that is too broad.
A case that may recognize a distinction between different types of
factual works is Runge v. Lee.73 In that case, plaintiff owned a salon
where she instructed clients on facial exercise. She wrote a book publish-
ing her technique and a few years later, one of her employees at the salon
published a competing book with the same exercises. Plaintiff sued for
copyright infringement and unfair competition. The jury found that the
book infringed because it had not been prepared using common sources
of knowledge but had been copied from plaintiff's work.74 Even though
the second work was not a verbatim reproduction, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. While the grounds for the court's decision are not entirely
clear,75 it may be based in part on its finding that the exercises that were
69. For example, there is only one real strategy for playing black-jack because the strategy
is dictated by a mathematical formula. By contrast, there are innumerable strategies for the
game of football since tactics will also depend on player personnel, weather conditions and
other variables.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
7 1. Take, for example, an idea which may be expressed in innumerable ways, like the idea
of a romantic triangle. Although the idea itself is not protected by copyright, an author's plot
expressing the idea may be protected. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). If Landsberg's idea for winning at Scrabble is simply one "plot"
expressing the broad idea of Scrabble strategy, by analogy to fictional works, his version should
be protected.
72. The district court found that Landsberg's notational system for expressing his strategy
was in the public domain and not protected by copyright. Landsbergfacts, 212 U.S.P.Q. at
161. None of the courts, however, discussed the nature of the strategy itself.
73. 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971).
74. Id. at 582.
75. Interestingly, what played a large part in the court's finding of infringement was de-
fendant's unlimited access to plaintiff's techniques, defendant's lack of writing experience and
the speed with which the manuscript was completed. Id. These findings are very similar to the
findings at issue in Landsberg. See supra notes 49-50, and accompanying text.
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the subject of the books were original to plaintiff.76 Since her book was
not factual information already in the public domain, but an explanation
of her original techniques, the court may have decided that requiring a
higher standard of substantial similarity was inappropriate."
Because the Landsberg I court did not analyze whether Landsberg's
strategy was original, it may have also incorrectly relied upon the scenes
a faire doctrine.7" The court had found that any similarities in expres-
sion between the two works were unavoidable because the subject matter
of both books could only be conveyed through these stock expressions.79
Even assuming Landsberg's strategy could only be formulated in a lim-
ited number of ways, the court did not address the possibility that the
subject matter of the two books was only so similar because S & R copied
Landsberg's original strategy instead of developing an alternative one of
its own.
Factual works are a problematic area of copyright law,80 and the
court in Landsberg I overlooked an opportunity to guide lower courts
dealing with the issue. By failing to recognize that all factual works are
not alike, the court reached a result which enables people to paraphrase
all nonfictional works, no matter how original, and avoid liability. Since
the whole point of the substantial similarity inquiry is to draw a line so
that there can be protection for more than solely verbatim use, the deci-
sion does not make sense. In the long run it will limit, rather than en-
courage, the free use of ideas. As the court in Meredith stated, "it is
hardly an inducement [for] someone ... to do the years of research and
scholarship needed to produce an authoritative text if an untrained free-
lance writer ... may paraphrase major portions and make a competing
text out of it.""1
The court attempted to mitigate this harsh rule as it applied to
Landsberg by finding an implied contract. In doing so, however, it mis-
interpreted prior case law and considerably broadened the range of situa-
tions in which an implied contract will be found.
76. Runge, 441 F.2d at 583.
77. Admittedly, this was not a popular decision. See Runge, 404 U.S. at 887 (Douglas'
dissent from denial of certiorari). See generally, 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 13-24.
78. See supra note 23, and accompanying text.
79. Landsberg 1, 736 F.2d at 489.
80. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (1985) (stating
that "[e]specially in the realm of factual narrative, the law is currently unsettled regarding the
ways in which copyrightable elements combine with the author's original contributions to
form protected expression.").
81. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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THE TEST FOR AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
It has long been the practice in the entertainment industry for writ-
ers to submit ideas, rather than complete works, to producers.82 Recog-
nizing that writers may be taken advantage of if these ideas were not
somehow protected, the courts have tried to strike a balance between the
complete protection of copyright and the complete denial of any legal
protection.83 In the landmark case of Desny v. Wilder ("Desny ,),84 the
California Supreme Court held for the first time that proof of an implied-
in-fact contract to pay for even an ordinary idea will render the idea
legally protectable as between the contracting parties."5 From this prin-
ciple has developed an emerging body of case law that is, unfortunately,
complicated by the decision in Landsberg II.
An implied contract differs from an express contract only in that the
existence and terms of an implied-in-fact contract can be shown by the
parties' conduct rather than by their words.8 6 Under California law, one
may recover for breach of an implied-in-fact contract by showing that:
1) he prepared the work, 2) he submitted the composition to the defend-
ants for sale, 3) the defendants, knowing it was offered for sale, accepted
and used the work, and 4) the work had some value.87 This is limited by
the principle that "[i]f disclosure occurs before it is known that compen-
sation is a condition of its use, however, no contract will be implied."88
The key issue in Landsberg II was not whether S & R used Lands-
berg's manuscript. By affirming the district court's findings of fact, the
Landsberg I court acknowledged that there was such use even though it
was not enough to constitute copyright infringement. The critical ques-
tion was whether an implied contract was formed, and if so, whether S &
R's use violated its terms.8 9 Although the court in Landsberg I found
that Landsberg's first disclosure of his manuscript "apparently preceded
any conduct on S & R's part indicating the existence of an implied-in-fact
82. Rokos v. Peck, 182 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1986).
83. 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 16-3.
84. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
85. Id. at 738, 299 P.2d at 269. Other theories available for protection of ideas are express
contracts, quasi-contracts and fiduciary relationships. 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 16-4.
86. Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 316, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1979).
87. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 744, 299 P.2d 257, 272 (1956).
88. Landsberg II, 802 F.2d at 1196. This principle is based on the notion that past consid-
eration is not valid for an enforceable contract. If plaintiff completely performs by disclosing
his idea before defendant has expressly or impliedly promised to pay for the idea, plaintiff's
disclosure, having been performed in the past, is not valid consideration to support defendant's
promise. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 16-20.
89. Landsberg 11, 802 F.2d at 1197.
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contract,''9° it nevertheless held that a contractual duty arose and was
breached because Landsberg's initial disclosure had been made in
confidence.
One problem with this decision is that it does not make clear what
relevance the confidential nature of Landsberg's submission should have
on his implied contract claim. The cases which the court cited for the
proposition that a plaintiff whose disclosure was made in confidence can
sue if the idea is then used, involved plaintiffs who brought suit under a
breach of confidence theory.91 Unlike an action for implied contract, a
breach of confidence action is quasi-contractual in nature; it is not based
on the parties' intentions but created by law for reasons of justice.92
Although the two causes of action are very similar,93 and Landsberg
probably could have prevailed on an action for breach of confidence, he
did not plead it. By using the term "confidence" and citing to breach of
confidence cases, the Landsberg 11 decision reads as though the court is
mingling the two causes of action. Since a breach of confidence action is
not based on the parties' intentions, the effect of such commingling
would be that a contract could be implied for reasons of fairness. This is
considerably broader than the current rule.94
The court's lack of findings on S & R's state of mind demonstrates
that it looked more at principles of fairness and less at the parties' inten-
tions. The trial court found that "Landsberg's belief that [S & R] would
90. Landsberg I, 736 F.2d at 490.
91. See Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 469, 310 P.2d 436 (1957);
Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 704 and Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 535
P.2d 1161, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975) all cited in Landsberg1, 736 F.2d at 490. Donahue v. Ziv
Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 593, 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966) also cited, involved
only an implied contract claim though the court suggested that plaintiff might have wished to
pursue a breach of confidence theory. Donahue, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 611, n. 11, 54 Cal. Rptr. at
138.
92. Tele-count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 455,
464, 214 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (1985).
93. An action for breach of confidence may arise whenever an idea, offered and received in
confidence, is later disclosed without permission. The idea does not need to be protectable
under copyright law nor does there need to be a fiduciary relationship between the parties.
Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
94. Another possible interpretation of the court's reliance on the confidentiality finding is
that the court believed that it was the confidential nature of the submission that made Lands-
berg's disclosure bargained for and not a "blurting out." If this is what the court meant, its
reasoning is still questionable. If Landsberg's book had already been published when he sub-
mitted it and therefore, not in confidence, his submission is still not a blurting out because his
idea was only disclosed at S & R's request. In Landsberg I, the court suggested that the
request for the second copy was bargained for, 736 F.2d at 490. This analysis has been severely
criticized. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 16.33 n.13.1.
1988]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
not use his manuscript without paying him for it was reasonable."95 But
it is not solely Landsberg's subjective belief that creates an implied con-
tract; both parties must understand that Landsberg's submission was
conditioned on payment. 96 Instead, the court assumed that S & R recog-
nized Landsberg's expectation of payment. While this may make sense
in the context of the entertainment industry where producers routinely
receive ideas, 97 it seems to be out of place here where the recipient is a
game company and less familiar with such dealings. It is also directly
contrary to the principle that an obligation to pay should not be inferred
from the mere submission of an idea on a theory that everyone knows the
idea man expects to be paid.98 This approach restrains the free use of
ideas because it could possibly render a defendant liable for a contract
that he did not realize he was making. For example, Landsberg, in this
case, submitted his idea to S & R with the sole intention of obtaining S &
R's permission to use its trademark. Changing the subsequent facts, as-
sume S & R accepted the manuscript and realizing it was very close to
something it was already developing, refused Landsberg's request, with
no negotiations ever taking place. S & R then published its book, and
Landsberg sued claiming that S & R breached an implied contract by
using his idea. Assuming Landsberg had sufficient evidence to prove use
by S & R, the rule in Landsberg II suggests that these facts would sup-
port a finding of an implied contract even though Landsberg had no in-
tention of selling his idea and S & R had no intention of buying it. This
is particularly dangerous in California because, unlike most jurisdictions,
novelty of the idea is not required for contractual protection.99 Since any
small idea from the manuscript can be protected by contract, the game
company could be held liable despite the absence of anything resembling
a true contract.
This result not only undercuts the rule in Desny but comes danger-
ously close to giving the idea man a monopoly on the use of his ideas.
Now mere disclosure to another in confidence of even the most common-
place idea may prevent that person from developing anything close to it
because of fear of liability. Unlike the rule in Landsberg I, this gives
creators of works too much protection.
Taken together, Landsberg I and Landsberg II narrow the scope of
95. Landsberg II, 802 F.2d at 1196.
96. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 744, 299 P.2d 257, 272 (1956).
97. 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 16-33. In the entertainment context, a producer may be
characterized as making a continuing offer to writers which becomes a binding contract upon
the writer's submission. Id.
98. Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 319, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
99. 3 NIMMER, supra note 36, at 16-52.
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protection formerly given to factual works under copyright laws while
broadening the possibility of relief afforded under contract law. This re-
sult is not only unfortunate but unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it
does little to help the plaintiff whose original idea has been stolen but has
not had enough dealings with the defendant in order to prevail on a con-
tract claim."o It is unnecessary because had the court correctly upheld
the copyright infringement judgment, it would not have had to later en-
large the scope of the contract remedy in order to give Landsberg the
relief he obviously deserved. In its quest to ensure that ideas remain
freely usable, the court has achieved the opposite result and further com-
plicated an already uncertain area of the law.
Doree Reno
100. See Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that there can
be no implied contract if there was no "direct submission" of plaintiffs' work to the
defendant.).
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